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Abstract
We consider a Cournot Oligopoly market of ﬁrms possessing increasing
returns to scale technologies. It is shown that an external regulating
agency can increase total social welfare without running a deﬁcit. It oﬀers
to subsidize one ﬁrm an amount which depends on the output level of
that ﬁrm and the market price. The ﬁrms bid for this contract and the
regulator collects the highest bid and subsidizes the highest bidding ﬁrm.
It is shown that there exists a subsidy schedule such that (i) The regulator
breaks even (namely the winning bid equals the total subsidy) (ii) The
winning ﬁrm obtains zero net proﬁt and charges a price equal to its average
cost (iii) Every other ﬁrm willingly exit the market and (iv) Market price
decreases, consumers are better oﬀ and total welfare improves.
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11 Introduction
The central motivation of this paper is to come up with a mechanism which pro-
motes eﬃciency in an oligopolistic industry which is characterized by increasing
returns to scale but operating ineﬃciently. We show that there exists a mecha-
nism which provides incentives to existing ﬁrms in an industry to implement a
strictly welfare improving outcome. Speciﬁcally this mechanism makes a com-
mand structure redundant, where production and pricing decisions of ﬁrms are
controlled by a regulatory authority.
We arrive at incentive mechanisms by which a benevolent regulator is able to
implement, without running a deﬁcit, a welfare improving outcome by making
every Cournot oligopolistic ﬁrm but one voluntarily exit the market. Addition-
ally, the existing monopolist willingly produces and prices more eﬃciently and
the society is better oﬀ.
To be more speciﬁc, the regulator oﬀers a contract to exclusively subsidize
one ﬁrm – the one who is willing to pay him the highest upfront fee for that
contract. The subsidy oﬀered by the regulator is of the form of a non-linear
scheme which depends on the output of the winning ﬁrm and market price. It
is shown winning ﬁrm sets a price equal to average cost and obtains zero net
proﬁt. All other ﬁrms exit the industry and the regulator breaks even. The
total welfare of the society is improved.
In a classic paper, Demsetz (1968) points out that regulation of a monopolis-
tic ﬁrm might be carried out in the entry stage itself. In an industry which is a
natural monopoly, suppose the regulator wants to grant a license which gives the
right to produce to a single ﬁrm. Each ﬁrm quotes a bid for the price at which
it will sell if granted the license. The ﬁrm with the lowest bid would ultimately
be awarded the contract to be the monopoly producer in the market. With a
large number of ﬁrms “competing for the ﬁeld”, the level of competitiveness
among potential entrants would ensure that the price charged by the winning
monopolist would be close to per-unit cost of production. Demsetz contends
that the winner is committed to charge no more than what it bids as it enters
a binding legal contract with the regulator.
2Baron and Myerson (1982) and Berg and Tschirhart (1988) deal with ways to
control a natural monopoly under asymmetric information, where the ﬁrm has
more information about its technology than the regulator. Sappington and Sib-
ley (1988) provide a mechanism where a regulator without any cost information
about the ﬁrm can implement marginal cost pricing and zero rents over multiple
periods. In the same vein, Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) describe an incentive
mechanism which induces the management of a multi-product monopoly to ad-
just the price structure step-by-step in the direction of the optimum. Guesnerie
and Laﬀont (1978) examine the likelihood of the government ensuring a ﬁrst
best outcome in a general equilibrium framework where one of the ﬁrms is a
monopolist in a particular commodity. They show that when non-convexities
are present in the proﬁt function of the monopolist, there exists optimal taxation
schemes which ensure optimal pricing by the monopolist. The most comprehen-
sive treatment of a large number of issues related to regulation of a natural
monopoly is by Laﬀont and Tirole (1993).
There have been a few papers dealing with industry structure per se. Au-
riol and Laﬀont (1992) discuss costs and beneﬁts of a duopoly structure when
marginal costs are private information and ﬁxed costs are common knowledge.
A duopoly is preferred by the government if the market structure is to be cho-
sen before marginal costs have been revealed to the ﬁrms themselves, whereas a
monopoly is socially better if the government needs to ﬁx the market structure
after the ﬁrms come to know their private marginal costs.
Grimm et al. (2003) examine under incomplete information, the design of
mechanisms to implement the optimal market structure assuming that a regu-
lator is unable to control ﬁrm behavior once ﬁrms have entered the market.
The paper closest in spirit to this one is by Liao and Tauman (2002). It
considers an N ﬁrm industry with constant marginal costs. It is shown that a
certain linear per unit subsidy schedule can induce the socially best outcome
while the regulator breaks even in the process. The result is quite straightfor-
ward. The regulator oﬀers a linear subsidy to just one ﬁrm. If the per unit
subsidy is chosen to be the ratio between marginal cost and the price elasticity
3of demand (at marginal cost), then the subsidized ﬁrm will produce the eﬃcient
outcome. Firms therefore would bid up to the subsidy cost for the right to be
subsidized and the regulator will not run any deﬁcit. The current paper gen-
eralizes this to the case of a Cournot industry with increasing returns to scale
technology.
In many industries, direct regulation might be a necessity given the cost
structure, but may not be possible because of political restrictions on govern-
ment intervention. With the current emphasis on deregulation, it might not
even be a desirable course of action. In such a climate, it is up to the regulator
to design proper incentive schemes which would make the industry regulate it-
self. Such a scheme would have to take into consideration not only the motives
of the ﬁrms themselves, but also the resulting impact on consumers as well as
the regulator’s own budget.
This paper focusses on the case of complete information. The cost functions
and the demand functions are all commonly known by the ﬁrms in the market
as well as by the regulator. In Section 2 we set up the basic model with sym-
metric ﬁrms and state our main result. In Section 3, we generalize our model
to incorporate asymmetry in the ﬁrms’ technologies.
2 The Model
We ﬁrst examine the situation when there are N ≥ 2 identical ﬁrms producing
a single commodity in the market. Market inverse demand is P(Q) each ﬁrm’s
production cost is given by C(qi). We consider the case where the technology
exhibits increasing returns to scale. The ﬁrms are engaged in Cournot compe-
tition. The demand and cost functions are common knowledge to all agents.
We postulate the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 P(Q) is twice diﬀerentiable, strictly decreasing and concave,
i.e. P0 < 0 and P00 ≤ 0 for all Q > 0.
Assumption 2 C(q) is twice diﬀerentiable for all q > 0. C0(q) > 0 and
4C00(q) < 0 for all q > 0. C(0) = 0 but limq→0C(q) ≥ 0.1 Namely, C(·)
may include a ﬁxed cost component.
The requirement that P00 < 0 is not standard in the literature. However, it
guarantees the concavity of the proﬁt functions (see Lemma 1, below) and hence
the existence of the Cournot equilibrium. Alternatively, we could drop the
concavity assumption of demand and require instead that
2P0(Q) + QP00(Q) − C00(q) < 0
for all Q > 0 and all 0 < q ≤ Q.
Assumption 3 P(q)−C0(q) is strictly decreasing for all q > 0 and there exists
q > 0, such that P(q) = C0(q).
For every q > 0, let AC(q) =
C(q)
q
. By Assumption 2, AC0(q) < 0 and
consequently AC(q) > C0(q) for all q > 0.2 Assumptions 3 implies that P(·)
and C0(·) intersect exactly once. Let,
πi(q1,...,qN) = qiP(Q) − C(qi) (1)





















= P0(Q) + qiP00(Q) + P0(Q) − C00(qi).
1In particular, we assume that this limit exists.
2Clearly, AC(q) is decreasing in q if
C(q)−C(0)













q1 = C0(ξ1) where q1 < ξ2 < q2 and 0 < ξ1 < q1. Since C00(·) < 0,
C0(ξ2) < C0(ξ1) and hence AC(q2) < AC(q1).




< P0(qi) − C00(qi) < 0
since P(qi) − C0(qi) is decreasing (Assumption 3). 
Lemma 1 implies the existence of a Cournot equilibrium.
In order to simplify the analysis we focus on a duopoly. The analysis of the
general case is a straightforward extension of the duopoly case. Suppose that





2 = Qd, Qd
i > 0 for i = 1,2.





i) ≥ 0. Hence, P(Qd) ≥ AC(Qd
i) ≥
AC(Qd). On the other hand, for each q > q, P(q) < C0(q) < AC(q) (see
Assumption 3). Since P(q) and AC(q) are continuous for q > 0, by the Mean
Value Theorem there exists q such that P(q) = AC(q). 
Let,
A = {q|P(q) = AC(q)}. (2)
Lemma 3 The set A is nonempty and compact.
Proof: See Appendix.
Let,
e Q = Max q∈A q. (3)
Lemma 4 e Q < q.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that e Q ≥ q. Then by Assumption 3, P( e Q) ≤
C0( e Q) < AC( e Q), a contradiction. 
Consider a regulator which desires to increase the total welfare of the society.
It could be the government or a government run regulatory authority. It is
assumed that the regulator has full information about market demand and cost
structures of the ﬁrms. The interaction between the regulator and the ﬁrms is
described as follows.
6In the ﬁrst stage, the regulator announces a subsidy schedule f(q,Q) to be
awarded exclusively to one ﬁrm. This ﬁrm producing q would be awarded a
lump-sum amount of f(q,Q). In the second stage, the ﬁrms announce simulta-
neously (or through sealed tenders) their own willingness to pay (bids) for this
contract. The ﬁrm with the highest willingness to pay is awarded the exclusive
contract. In case of a tie, the regulator awards the subsidy randomly to any
one ﬁrm. The winning ﬁrm pays its bid to the regulator. In the last stage, the
ﬁrms compete a l´ a Cournot, that is in quantities.
Consider the following subsidy schedule,
f(q,Q) = −qP(Q) +
q Z
0
P(x)dx − e t · q + δ (4)
where e t = P( e Q) − C0( e Q), Q is the total industry output and δ > 0. The payoﬀ
function of the subsidized ﬁrm i is,
πS
i (qi,qj) = qiP(Q) − C(qi) + f(qi,Q) + δ − αi









P(x)dx − C(qi) − e t · qi + δ − αi (5)
and as we see, πS
i depends only on the quantity produced by the subsidized
ﬁrm.
The payoﬀ function of the other ﬁrm j, j 6= i, is
πj(qi,qj) = qjP(Q) − C(qj)
and the payoﬀ of the regulator is αi − fi(qi,Q).
The above describes a game G between the regulator and the ﬁrms of the
industry.
The parameter δ > 0 is chosen to satisfy the inequality
πS
k( e Q) > πk(Qd
1,Qd
2) k = i,j.
This eliminates an equilibrium where both i and j do not bid for the contract.
We are ready to state and prove our ﬁrst main result.
7Theorem 1 The game G has an unique subgame perfect equilibrium. The sub-
sidized ﬁrm produces the output level e Q and earns a net proﬁt of zero. The other
ﬁrms exit the market and the regulator breaks even. Finally, the total welfare of
the society increases as compared with the no subsidy case.




= P(qi) − C0(qi) − e t = P(qi) − C0(qi) − [P( e Q) − C0( e Q)]




= 0, iﬀ qi = e Q.
Namely, independent of the output level qj of j, ﬁrm i is best oﬀ producing e Q
units, and πS
i ( e Q) = f( e Q) − αi.
We now prove that the other ﬁrm j is best oﬀ exiting the market given
that i produces e Q. Firm j will stay in the market only if πj(qj, e Q) ≥ 0, that
is if, P( e Q + qj) ≥ AC(qj). Since AC(·) is decreasing AC(qj) > AC( e Q + qj).
Consequently, j may stay in the market only if P( e Q+qj) > AC( e Q+qj). Suppose
that the last inequality holds and qj > 0. By Assumption 3, P(q) < C0(q) <
AC(q) for all q > q. Hence by continuity of P(q) and AC(q) there exists q
such that e Q < q < q and P(q) = AC(q), a contradiction to the deﬁnition of e Q.
Consequently, qj = 0 must hold and j exits the market. We can now write the
subsidy schedule as f(q) instead of f(q,Q), since Q = q.
Lemma 5 f( e Q) > 0.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Thus in order to win the subsidy, each ﬁrm would be willing to pay its entire
gross proﬁt, that is αi = f( e Q). Hence, the subsidized ﬁrm makes zero net
proﬁt in equilibrium and the regulator breaks even. As we have already see, the
subsidized ﬁrm i produces e Q irrespective of what j produces. j in turn has the
unique best response of qj = 0. Hence this equilibrium is unique.
Note that the lowest price the regulator can induce without running a deﬁcit
is P( e Q) = AC( e Q). The reason is that for any q > e Q, P(q) < AC(q), which
means that the gross proﬁt of the subsidized ﬁrm is less than f(q). Hence, the
regulator will not be able to recover the subsidy.
8We next show that the subsidy schedule of the regulator improves the total



























On the other hand, the total welfare with the subsidy schedule f(q) is,
TW2 = CS( e Q) =
e Q Z
0
P(x)dx − e QP( e Q) =
e Q Z
0
P(x)dx − C( e Q)
The net gain in welfare,











P(x)dx − C(q) + C(Qd
i) + C(Qd
j).







g0(q) = P(q) − C0(q).
By Assumption 3, g0(q) > 0 iﬀ, q < q. By Lemma 4, e Q < q and thus if Qd < e Q
then ∆ = g( e Q) > g(Qd) > 0, as claimed. We are left to prove that Qd < e Q.
Since πd
i ≥ 0, we have by Assumption 2,
P(Qd) ≥ AC(Qd
i) > AC(Qd)
9Also, e Q is the maximal number such that P( e Q) = AC( e Q). Namely, for any
q > e Q, P(q) < AC(q). Hence, Qd < e Q. As a result, total welfare of the society
improves.
Remark The following is a simple alternative mechanism which yields the






δ if q ≥ e Q
−δ if q < e Q
where δ > 0 is determined below. The idea is to induce the subsidized ﬁrm to
produce the output level e Q. If it produces q, such that q < e Q, it will have to pay
the regulator a ﬁne of δ. As before, the regulator oﬀers an exclusive contract to
the highest bidder. Let π0
1,...,π0
N be the Cournot oligopoly proﬁt levels of the
ﬁrms in the standard non-subsidy case. To eliminate the equilibrium outcome
where no ﬁrm is bidding for the contract ˆ f, we require δ > π0
i −[ e QP( e Q)−C( e Q)].
Otherwise, no ﬁrm has an incentive to win the contract even for a zero bid. In
addition, δ should be suﬃciently large to guarantee δ > πM where πM is the
monopoly proﬁt. Otherwise, the subsidized ﬁrm is best oﬀ deviating from e Q
to the monopoly output. It is easy to verify that in every subgame perfect
equilibrium at least two ﬁrms will bid δ and the other ﬁrms will either bid
below δ or will not bid at all. The winning produces e Q and all the other ﬁrms
exit the market.
The problem with this mechanism is that the equilibrium outcome is based
on weakly dominated strategies. The subsidized ﬁrm obtains in equilibrium a
zero net payoﬀ but if some ﬁrms do not exit the market and produces positive
output levels, then the subsidized ﬁrm is guaranteed to make a loss. If it does
adjust its output level and produce below e Q it will have to pay the ﬁne δ
(in addition to the bid δ). If it continues to produce e Q, its gross proﬁt is
( e Q + q)P( e Q + q) − C( e Q + q) which by deﬁnition of e Q (and Assumption 3) is
negative.
With the subsidy scheme f(q,Q) given by (4), the regulator takes the risk
3This mechanism was suggested to us by Elchanan Ben-Porath during a seminar given by
one of the authors, held in the Center for Rationality in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
10of over production. The subsidized ﬁrm will end up with zero proﬁt on or oﬀ
the equilibrium path, since its net proﬁt does not depend on the output levels
of the other ﬁrms.
2.1 An Example
Let P(q) = a−rq and C(q) = −q2+2bq where b > 0, 0 ≤ q ≤ b, 2b < a < (r+1)b
and r > 2. Then P(q) = C0(q) implies q =
a − 2b
r − 2




. Note that e Q < b since a < (r + 1)b. The total welfare when the
regulator oﬀers the subsidy is,









Consider now the case where the regulator oﬀers no subsidy. There are N ﬁrms
competing a l´ a Cournot. The proﬁt of every ﬁrm is then,












r(N + 1) − 2
and the total output is,
Q∗ =
N(a − 2b)





The total industry proﬁt is,
Π∗ =
(r − 1)N(a − 2b)2
[r(N + 1) − 2]2







h a − 2b
r(N + 1) − 2
.
i2
Hence the total welfare of the society is,
TW2 = Π∗ + CS∗ =
[rN
2
2 + N(r − 1)](a − 2b)2





r(r − 2)(a − 2b)2
[r(N + 1) − 2]2 > 0.
Consequently, the total welfare is maximized in a competitive industry (i.e.




(a − 2b)2 and limn→∞ TW2 < TW1
iﬀ r2 > (r − 1)2, which always holds.
3 The Case of Non Symmetric Firms
Consider the case where the N ﬁrms are not necessarily symmetric. Their cost
functions are Ci(qi), where i = 1,...,N. Assumptions 2 and 3 are modiﬁed
accordingly. Namely,
Assumption 2a For every i, Ci(qi) is diﬀerentiable for all qi > 0, C0
i(qi) > 0
and C00
i (qi) < 0 for all qi > 0. C(0) = 0 but limqi→0C(qi) ≥ 0.
Assumption 3a For every i, P(q) − C0
i(q) is strictly decreasing for all q > 0
and there exists qi > 0, such that P(qi) = C0
i(qi).
Lemma 2a For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, there exists qi such that P(qi) = ACi(qi).
The proof of Lemma 2a is the same as proof of Lemma 2. Deﬁne,
Ai = {qi|P(qi) = ACi(qi)}




Lemma 3a The set A is non-empty and compact.
The proof follows from Lemma 3 and from the fact that a ﬁnite union of compact
sets is compact.
12Let,
e Q = Maxq∈A q
Let I be the set of all ﬁrms i such that e Q ∈ Ai. Namely, I is the set of all ﬁrms
such that P( e Q) = ACi( e Q).
For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, deﬁne
fi(qi,Q) = −qiP(Q) +
qi Z
0
P(x)dx − [P( e Q) − C0
i( e Q)]qi (8)
where Q is the total industry output. Suppose that a ﬁrm i is subsidized ac-
cording to fi(qi,Q). Then by (8) its net proﬁt is,
πS
i (qi) = −Ci(qi) +
qi Z
0
P(x)dx − qi[P( e Q) − C0
i( e Q)] (9)
where αi is the fee it pays to the regulator. Note that πS
i depends only on qi




= P(qi) − C0(qi) − [P( e Q) − C0( e Q)] = 0
By Assumption 3a, the unique solution is qi = e Q. Namely, irrespective of the
cost function of the subsidized ﬁrm, it will produce e Q units as output.
Next consider the following sequential interaction between the regulator and
the ﬁrms.
Stage 1. The regulator orders the N ﬁrms in a sequence where ﬁrms in I have to
precede any other ﬁrm not in I. This sequence is publicly announced.
Stage 2. The regulator makes a “take-it-or-leave-it” oﬀer to the ﬁrst ﬁrm in the
sequence (a ﬁrm in I) to subsidize it according to fi(qi,Q) (given by
(8)) in return for an upfront fee αi = fi( e Q, e Q). If i accepts the oﬀer, it
will become the unique subsidized ﬁrm. Otherwise the regulator makes
a similar oﬀer to the second ﬁrm in the sequence, and so on. If the ﬁrst
N −1 ﬁrms reject the oﬀer then the regulator will oﬀer the last ﬁrm, say j,
the subsidy schedule fj(qj,Q) but for a reduced fee of αj = fj( e Q, e Q)−π0
j
where π0
j is the Cournot oligopoly proﬁt of j in case no ﬁrm is subsidized
and provided that j is not in I. If every ﬁrm is in I, then αj = fj( e Q, e Q)
13Stage 3. The ﬁrms compete a l´ a Cournot.
The payoﬀ function of the subsidized ﬁrm (if there is one) is given by (9).
The payoﬀ function of any other ﬁrm j is given by,
πk(qk) = qkP(Q) − Ck(qk),
and the regulator’s payoﬀ is the total welfare of the society.
The above mechanism describes a game Ga.
Theorem 1a Every subgame perfect equilibrium of Ga satisﬁes the following.
i. One ﬁrm is subsidized and it is a ﬁrm i in I (i.e. P( e Q) = ACi( e Q)).
ii. The subsidized ﬁrm produces e Q and earns a net proﬁt of zero.
iii. All other ﬁrms exit the market.
iv. The regulator breaks even.
v. The total welfare of the society is improved.
Proof: As mentioned above, every subsidized ﬁrm will produce the output e Q.
In this case the best reply for any other ﬁrm is to exit the market (see proof of
Theorem 1). Also similar to the symmetric case, the total welfare under e Q is
higher than that of the Cournot oligopoly when no ﬁrm is subsidized.
Suppose next that the regulator’s oﬀer is rejected by the ﬁrst N − 1 ﬁrms.
Then we argue that the last ﬁrm, say j, will accept the oﬀer in equilibrium.
More precisely, this ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the oﬀer
fj(qj,Q) in exchange for αj = fj( e Q, e Q), since the net payoﬀ will be π0
j in both
cases. But if j rejects the oﬀer, the regulator has an incentive to slightly reduce
his fee αj in order to induce j to accept the oﬀer. The regulator himself beneﬁts
from reducing the fee as the total welfare under e Q is strictly larger than that of
the Cournot oligopoly when no ﬁrm was subsidized. Thus the ﬁrm before j in
the sequence knows that if it does not accept the oﬀer it would ultimately be
driven out by j and hence accepts. Working backwards, it is evident that the
14ﬁrst ﬁrm who has been made the oﬀer by the regulator accepts it readily. The
regulator himself breaks even. 
Remarks
1. The regulator is indiﬀerent between the ﬁrms who are in I since any of
them can costlessly induce the eﬃcient outcome. Therefore, if |I| ≥ 2,
there are multiple equilibria where the subsidized ﬁrm could be any one
of the ﬁrms in I, and not necessarily the ﬁrst in the sequence.
2. In the case where |I| ≥ 2, Theorem 1a can be obtained in a much simpler
mechanism (similar to the one described in the game G in Section 2). The
regulator oﬀers an exclusive subsidy schedule to the highest bidder. The
schedule is fi(qi,Q) given by (8) for some i ∈ I. The competition between
the ﬁrms in I induce them to bid αi = fi( e Q, e Q), k ∈ I. A ﬁrm j not in
I, however will not be able to aﬀord a bid of fi( e Q, e Q) since by deﬁnition
of e Q, P( e Q) − ACj( e Q) < 0. Hence, the subsidized ﬁrm is one from I.
Consequently, the sequential mechanism described in Ga is need only if
|I| = 1.
15Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 3
First note that there exists δ > 0 such that for 0 ≤ q < δ, AC(q) and P(q) do not
intersect. Indeed, if C(0) = 0 then limq→0AC(q) = C0(0) and by Assumption
3, limq→0AC(q) < P(0). By the continuity of AC(q) and P(q), there exists
δ > 0 such that AC(q) < P(q) for the q < δ. Consequently, A ⊆ {q|q ≥ δ}. By
Lemma 2, A 6= φ. Again by Assumption 3, for q > q, P(q) < C0(q) < AC(q).
Hence, A ⊆ {q|δ ≤ q ≤ q}, and thus is bounded. By the continuity of AC(·)
and P(·) for q > 0 A is closed, implying A is nonempty and bounded. 
B Proof of Lemma 5
We have,
f( e Q) = − e QP( e Q) +
e Q Z
0




P(x)dx − e t · e Q − C( e Q)
as P( e Q) = AC( e Q). Let us show that
e Q Z
0




P(x)dx − e tq. Then
S0(q) = P(q) − [AC( e Q) − C0( e Q)].
Thus S0(q) ≥ C0(q) iﬀ P(q) − C0(q) ≥ AC( e Q) − C0( e Q) = P( e Q) − C0( e Q).
But the last inequality holds by Assumption 3 for any 0 < q ≤ e Q (since
e Q < q). Also S0(0) = P(0) − e t > P( e Q) − e t = C0( e Q) > 0 and S(0) = 0 = C(0).
Consequently S(q) > C(q) for all 0 < q ≤ e Q. In particular, C( e Q) < S( e Q) =
e Q Z
0
P(x)dx − e t and πM( e Q) > 0. 
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